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The AfD achieves its strongest result yet in a state election in Saxony-Anhalt, shaking the existing party system. But election night raises a more complicated question than simply winners and losers: Why does the AfD reach more than 40 percent despite improving economic data? What responsibility do the democratic parties bear, and what responsibility do the media bear? Should the CDU defend its firewall? And must an AfD ban proceeding now be seriously examined?
Saxony-Anhalt held elections on September 6, 2026—and the result is of historic proportions. According to the provisional final results, the AfD secured around 43.8 percent of the vote. The CDU fell back to approximately 17 percent. This means the AfD more than doubled its 2021 result, while the CDU suffered a dramatic loss compared to the 37.1 percent it achieved back then. At the same time, voter turnout rose to a record level.
This is not an election victory that can be explained by low turnout or the mobilization of a small political minority. A large share of Saxony-Anhalt voted deliberately. And precisely for that reason, it would be too simple to judge the voters purely on moral grounds.
Who Votes for the AfD?
Perhaps the most important insight of this election night is: there is no longer a single typical AfD voter. According to the analyses, the AfD leads among both men and women, among younger and older voter groups alike. The ARD analysis is based on around 20,000 interviews at 180 polling stations.
This makes it increasingly difficult to sustain the notion that the AfD is voted for only by a socially isolated fringe group. Among its voters are workers and employees, self-employed people, people in rural regions, younger working people, pensioners, and citizens with very different educational and income backgrounds. Some vote for the AfD out of ideological conviction. Others out of protest.
Others cite migration, internal security, energy policy, social insecurity, high prices, a lack of trust in state institutions, or the feeling of no longer being heard by Berlin. This is precisely where the challenge for the democratic parties lies. Anyone who treats all these people indiscriminately as extremists will struggle to win them back politically.
But Not Every Statement May Be Relativized
At the same time, the necessary differentiation toward voters must not lead to genuine radicalization being downplayed. A publicly shared Instagram reel from the account @kevinheibel_ shows a particularly drastic excerpt.
In the video, a person can be heard first talking about weapons and then stating, in substance, that they would have no problem with weapons being used to shoot foreigners. Such a statement is not a normal migration-policy demand.
There is a fundamental line between calling for border controls, deportations, or a reduction in immigration, and the idea of killing people because of their origin. This is a dehumanizing fantasy of violence. Journalistically, however, precision must be maintained regarding what the reel actually proves.
From the published excerpt, it cannot be reliably established which party the person in question voted for, or whether they belong to any political organization at all. The statement must therefore not be attributed to several hundred thousand AfD voters. This distinction is essential: not every AfD voter is a right-wing extremist. But right-wing extremist, racist, or violence-related statements must also not be downplayed out of political consideration.
The Great Paradox: The Economy Is Improving
The election result is particularly interesting against the backdrop of the latest economic data. The picture of the German economy is now considerably better than it appeared in spring 2026. In April, the federal government had lowered its growth forecast to just 0.5 percent for 2026 due to geopolitical pressures.
Just a few months later, the situation looks markedly different. Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel now considers growth of around one percent possible. The DIW Berlin even expects 1.2 percent growth for 2026. The ifo Institute raised its forecast even further on September 3, now expecting 1.4 percent. For 2027, the ifo Institute anticipates a further 1.2 percent. This is a remarkable shift. Germany is thus no longer clearly in the economic stagnation that dominated political discussion just a few months ago.
The DIW attributes its upward revision in particular to surprisingly strong exports and a smaller energy price shock than initially expected. At the same time, however, the institute warns against speaking of an already secured recovery. High energy prices, structural weaknesses, and continued cautious private investment remain risks. The ifo Institute likewise identifies bright spots — explicitly including for the long-troubled industrial sector. Alongside foreign demand, additional government spending on infrastructure and defense is acting as a growth driver.
The Chemical Industry, Too, Sends Better Signals for the First Time
The latest figures from the German Chemical Industry Association — VCI — are particularly notable. The chemical-pharmaceutical industry is among Germany’s most important industrial sectors. It employs around 476,000 people and generates industry revenue of roughly 220 billion euros. As recently as 2025, the situation was decidedly poor. Production and producer prices were declining, revenue fell, and capacity utilization reached historic lows. But the latest VCI data from September 3, 2026, show at least an upward movement.
In the second quarter of 2026, chemical-pharmaceutical production rose 2.4 percent, seasonally adjusted, compared to the previous quarter. Compared to the corresponding quarter of the previous year, it was 0.9 percent higher.
Revenue developed even more clearly. It rose 7.3 percent compared to the previous quarter, to 54.5 billion euros. According to the VCI, this was the first noticeable revenue increase in more than three years. That is a significant signal for one of Germany’s most important industrial sectors. However, it would be wrong to already infer a complete industrial upturn from this.
The VCI itself warns of a fragile development. Part of the production increase results from special effects, including stockpiling purchases and changes in international supply chains as a result of the Middle East conflict.
For the full year, the association continues to expect a decline in chemical-pharmaceutical production of 1.5 percent. For revenue, by contrast, it forecasts a rise of 2.5 percent, which, however, would be driven predominantly by higher prices. The economic reality is therefore not: Germany is suddenly experiencing a boom again.
It is: after several years of crisis, there are for the first time clearer signs of economic stabilization — but the industrial substance remains vulnerable.
Why Does the Federal Government Barely Benefit Politically?
This is precisely where one of the central political questions after the Saxony-Anhalt election arises. If economic growth and industrial indicators are improving, why is this not reflected more strongly in support for the governing parties? One possible explanation: economic statistics and personal perception do not move in sync over time. Growth of 1.2 or 1.4 percent does not automatically mean that an employee has more money at the end of the month.
A revenue increase in the chemical industry does not mean that an employee has no fear for their job. And billions in investment in infrastructure or defense are not automatically visible to a citizen if, at the same time, the local bridge is closed, the school is in need of renovation, or an appointment at a government office is hard to get. What matters politically, therefore, is not only objective growth. What is decisive is whether growth reaches the citizen.
The AfD Benefits from the Time Lag
Populist parties have a political advantage in such situations. They can point to the experiences of recent years: recession. Inflation. High energy prices. Business closures. Migration conflicts. Overburdened municipalities. Housing shortages. Uncertainty.
The fact that individual economic indicators are now improving does not erase these experiences overnight. The democratic parties must therefore avoid one mistake: they must not use better economic figures to tell citizens that their concerns are outdated. Instead, they should understand the positive development as the beginning of a process. The message must be: there is progress — but the reform work is not yet finished.
Berlin Must Follow Through on Economic Policy
The figures actually give the federal government an opportunity. If Germany is indeed moving from an expected 0.5 percent growth toward one percent or beyond, this must give rise to a longer-term economic policy strategy. Cutting red tape. Faster approvals. Cheaper and more reliable energy. Investment in infrastructure. Digitalization of public administration. More competitive corporate taxation. And an industrial policy that makes Germany more attractive as a business location again. The VCI has pointed out for years that energy-intensive industries in particular are under structural pressure. The current uptick must therefore not be taken as an occasion to postpone reforms. On the contrary. An incipient recovery is exactly the moment when structural reforms can be implemented more easily than in the middle of a recession.
The CDU Must Remain Steadfast
At the same time, pressure on the CDU is growing after this election night. It is already being argued that the so-called firewall has failed, since it evidently has not made the AfD smaller. This conclusion is not convincing.
A firewall is not an election campaign strategy. It is not meant to automatically ensure that the AfD receives fewer votes. Rather, it defines a boundary for the joint exercise of state power.
The CDU should therefore continue to say: no coalition with the AfD. No CDU government dependent on the AfD. No strategic parliamentary cooperation to form political majorities.
The same applies at the federal level for the CDU and CSU. A motion does not automatically become wrong simply because the AfD happens to vote for it as well. But there is a considerable difference between an incidental parliamentary majority and a planned cooperation. This boundary must be maintained.
The Union Must Not Leave AfD Voters to the AfD
However, a firewall does not mean a wall against the voters. On the contrary. The Union must now fight even harder for these citizens. A consistent migration policy is not AfD policy. Internal security is not AfD policy. The demand for a competitive industrial location is not AfD policy. Limiting state bureaucracy is not AfD policy. And patriotism within a European, rule-of-law-based, and Western-oriented order is likewise not AfD policy. A self-confident CDU/CSU does not need to move further to the right to be conservative. It must once again make clear why a conservative offer within the democratic constitutional framework can be more attractive than radical opposition.
Journalists Are Increasingly Becoming Political Actors Themselves
The media, too, should reflect on their role after this election day. Journalists are of course citizens. They are allowed to hold political opinions. They are allowed to be conservative, liberal, social democratic, left-wing, or green. And they are allowed to express these views, in particular in commentary pieces.
But the boundaries between news, analysis, personal opinion, and political activism are becoming increasingly blurred. Social networks reinforce this development. Journalists today sometimes have tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of personal followers. There, they criticize parties, welcome political decisions, and publicly position themselves on political strategies.
Julia Ruhs as an Example
The journalist Julia Ruhs exemplifies this development. She has publicly and clearly taken a position on the AfD debate and the firewall, and among other things has positively assessed a parliamentary majority involving AfD votes. She is entitled to do so.
Journalists do not lose their freedom of opinion because of their profession. But for the audience, it must remain recognizable when a journalist is reporting and when she is representing her own political position. A specific voting recommendation from Ruhs in favor of a particular party in the state election in Baden-Württemberg should not be claimed without a clear primary source. The larger problem, however, remains:
When journalists effectively become political actors themselves, media outlets must distinguish even more clearly between reporting and opinion. This applies, incidentally, to all political directions. A voting recommendation for the Greens, the Left, the SPD, or the CDU is just as much a political positioning as a recommendation in favor of a right-wing party.
Axel Springer and the Power of Normalization
Even more significant is the role of large media corporations. Here, Axel Springer and Mathias Döpfner in particular must be discussed. Springer, with Bild and Welt, has two extraordinarily far-reaching German media brands and, beyond that, considerable international influence. This power is legitimate. But power creates responsibility. Axel Springer did not create the AfD. And there is no solid evidence that the publishing house directly caused the election outcome in Saxony-Anhalt.
Such a claim would be irresponsible. Equally irresponsible, however, would be the notion that a media corporation of this size has no influence whatsoever on political perception. Media help determine: which topics dominate daily. Which politicians are constantly visible. Which statements become headlines. Which terms become established. Which political shifts of boundaries appear as a scandal and which as a necessary breaking of taboos.
Whoever Distributes Reach Exercises Power
Particularly controversial, therefore, was the decision by Welt am Sonntag to give Elon Musk a platform shortly before the federal election for an explicit endorsement in favor of the AfD. There was a journalistic counter-position.
But even with a counter-argument, the publication remains an editorial decision. Freedom of opinion does not obligate any newspaper to give an already extremely far-reaching entrepreneur a further stage for a specific voting recommendation. Editorial teams make choices. And precisely this selection is publishing power.
Döpfner and the Firewall
Mathias Döpfner himself rejects coalitions with the AfD. At the same time, he criticizes the strategy and rhetoric of the firewall. He is of course entitled to do so. But this position, too, may be firmly criticized. For the fact that the firewall has not weakened the AfD does not prove that it has become superfluous. A fire door does not become pointless simply because the fire in front of it grows larger.
The firewall is not meant to replace economic policy. It does not solve any migration problem. It does not lower energy prices. It does not build any housing. But it does prevent democratic parties from strategically making their governing majorities dependent on a party for which there are significant constitutional concerns. This boundary should remain in place.
Must an AfD Ban Proceeding Now Follow?
The election result does not create any legal obligation for the federal government to file a ban application. Furthermore, the federal government cannot ban the AfD itself. That is decided exclusively by the Federal Constitutional Court. The federal government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat are entitled to file such an application. The question following Saxony-Anhalt is therefore not: “Must the AfD be banned tomorrow?” It is: given its now enormous political strength, has the time come to have the available material comprehensively and independently examined for the prospects of success of a ban proceeding? This question is legitimate.
The NPD Ruling Takes On New Significance
In the second ban proceeding against the NPD, the Federal Constitutional Court recognized anti-constitutional aims but did not ban the party. A decisive problem was its political insignificance. There was no real possibility of successfully implementing its anti-constitutional aims. For a party that achieves more than 40 percent of the vote in a state, this so-called potentiality question obviously presents itself differently.
That does not mean: 44 percent equals a party ban. An election result does not prove unconstitutionality. But no one can argue that such a party is politically completely insignificant. Precisely for that reason, the legal question must now be examined particularly carefully.
A Ban Proceeding Is Not Directed Against the Voters
This point is crucial. A party ban proceeding is directed against a political organization. Not against its voters. People are allowed to reject the federal government. They are allowed to demand a radically different migration policy. They are allowed to criticize the EU. They are allowed to argue in conservative or nation-state terms. They are allowed to sharply criticize politicians. All of this belongs to a free society.
The boundary arises where an organization is demonstrably geared toward abolishing or substantially impairing the free democratic basic order and meets the constitutional requirements for a ban. This decision must not be made on the basis of political mood. It must be made in court on the basis of evidence.
Saxony-Anhalt Is More Than a Shift to the Right
The most important insight of this election night therefore perhaps lies in a contradiction. The economic figures are beginning to improve. The German economy could grow in 2026 not only by the 0.5 percent expected in spring, but according to current forecasts between roughly one and 1.4 percent. In the chemical industry, too, better quarterly figures are appearing for the first time in years. And yet the AfD rises to more than 40 percent. This shows: economic recovery alone does not repair lost trust.
Trust develops more slowly. People need to experience that the state functions. That political decisions are comprehensible. That migration is being managed. That economic improvement reaches employees and businesses. That democratic parties compete with one another over solutions, rather than merely jointly warning against the AfD. And that journalists inform, provide context, and visibly distinguish between news and their own political opinion.
The Firewall Must Stay — the Policy Behind It Must Get Better
Saxony-Anhalt should therefore serve neither as an argument for political resignation nor for a hasty rapprochement with the AfD. The CDU/CSU should remain steadfast. The firewall should remain in place. But it must never become a substitute for its own policies. Anyone who wants to win back a citizen with economic worries needs economic policy. Anyone who wants to address concerns about migration needs a functioning migration policy. Anyone who wants to restore trust in the state needs functioning institutions.
And anyone who wants to combat an extremist party politically must at the same time make democratic alternatives more attractive. The latest economic figures show that Germany may, for the first time in years, be getting a chance at a genuine recovery. This chance must be seized. Saxony-Anhalt shows at the same time that economic growth alone is not enough. A democratic society needs economic prospects, political capacity to act, clear boundaries against extremism, and media that are aware of their enormous responsibility.
The firewall must stay.
The economy must keep growing.
The democratic parties must win back the voters.
And if sufficient factual and legal grounds exist, the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the federal government must also be willing to seriously examine the instruments of a resilient democracy. For a democracy proves its strength neither by ignoring 44 percent of voters nor by abandoning its own boundaries. It proves it by being able to do both: listen — and stand firm.
