Europe’s Security in Transition: How Much Responsibility Will the US Still Take?

The United States wants to bring new momentum to talks on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, Europe is working to strengthen its military capacity to act. Both developments lead to a question that reaches far beyond the next negotiating date: how much responsibility will the US take for Europe’s defense in the future, and what must European states do themselves?
Image: Bundesregierung/Jesco Denzel

The United States wants to bring new momentum to talks on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, Europe is working to strengthen its military capacity to act. Both developments lead to a question that reaches far beyond the next negotiating date: how much responsibility will the US take for Europe’s defense in the future, and what must European states do themselves?

The statements and consultations of October 28 and 29 show how closely diplomacy, military support and industrial capacity are now intertwined. While Washington points to progress in negotiations, Brussels is focused on the conditions that would allow Europe to guarantee its security even under shifting American priorities.

Trump Announces a Meeting With Putin and Zelensky

“A meeting will be set up very soon,” US President Donald Trump told reporters on October 28. Asked who would take part, he named Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump highlighted progress in his efforts to end the war. However, he did not present a specific date, location or agreed negotiating format. His statement therefore describes, for now, a political expectation. A binding agreement among the governments involved on a presidential summit cannot yet be derived from it. For Europe, it also remains unclear what place its representatives would have in such talks.

This distinction is crucial. A meeting can enable diplomatic movement, but it does not yet answer any of the difficult questions of a possible peace settlement. Who would monitor a ceasefire? What support would Ukraine receive in the event of a renewed attack? Which states would be willing to provide personnel or military capabilities? And how would the United States support a European security guarantee? As long as these points remain unresolved, announcements of talks can hardly dispel the uncertainty about the future security architecture. For European governments, it is therefore about having a say and, at the same time, about the means with which they could actually underpin any agreements.

Moscow’s Reservations and Zelensky’s Order of Priorities

Statements from Moscow illustrated how contested even the composition of the talks is. According to a Reuters report on remarks by Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov on October 28, European participation in the planned trilateral consultations had not been part of the arrangements. Ushakov also pointed to conditions that could affect a new date, including the situation in the Middle East. There is thus considerable distance between Trump’s optimism and Russian reservations. The prospect of further talks exists; their timing and political scope remain open.

From Ukraine’s perspective, such diplomacy must not push the security interests of the country under attack into the background. “First we have to resolve the question of this war,” Zelensky said, according to a report published on October 29 citing the Financial Times. Only afterward, he said, could broader Russian security demands be addressed. Zelensky thus emphasized a sequence: ending the war and securing Ukraine must be the starting point. Moscow’s demands for a changed European security order, by contrast, affect numerous states and can therefore hardly be negotiated exclusively between Washington and Moscow.

Zelenskyy meets with Steve Witkoff, Alexander Stubb, and Jonas Gahr Støre in Norway – Image: Ukrainian President’s Gallery

American Responsibility: More Than Troop Numbers

Against this background, the question of American responsibility cannot be answered solely by the number of soldiers stationed in Europe. It encompasses political commitments, military planning, arms deliveries and the willingness to act quickly in a crisis. European governments must distinguish which American contributions they can continue to rely on and where they need their own capabilities. The defense of NATO territory and possible security guarantees for Ukraine are different tasks. A commitment to Ukraine would have to explicitly define its scope, triggers and implementation. Without this clarity, it remains difficult to assess what obligations Europe would actually assume.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth demonstrated in the Philippines on October 28 that Washington is simultaneously turning its attention to other regions of the world. At a meeting with Southeast Asian defense ministers, he proposed a new framework for military cooperation between the US and ASEAN. He described the American approach as “strong, calm and clear.” The priorities he named included maritime domain awareness, naval cooperation and the ability to operate together. This does not imply a new decision on American troops in Europe. The appearance does, however, make clear that European security interests are part of a global American prioritization.

For Europeans, this creates a demanding planning task. They must maintain cooperation with the US while becoming more resilient in case American resources are needed elsewhere. What matters is which capabilities are available in an emergency. Additional budget funds can enable procurement and training, but they replace neither combat-ready units nor functioning supply chains. Between a political funding decision and an actually available military capability lie production times, recruitment, exercises and technical coordination. European self-reliance will therefore be measured above all by whether states organize these steps jointly and in time.

Military Mobility: NATO and the EU Confer in Brussels

A concrete example was provided by the meeting between NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius in Brussels on October 28. According to the Alliance, they discussed readiness, increased defense production and continued support for Ukraine. Particular emphasis was placed on military mobility. Troops and equipment must be able to move within Europe; this requires suitable infrastructure and workable cross-border procedures. Rutte welcomed the progress in cooperation but, according to NATO, also pointed to further need for action.

Behind this technical-sounding term lie immediate questions of deterrence. A unit can only fulfill its mission if vehicles, ammunition and supplies arrive at the intended location in time. Bridges, rail lines, transshipment points and approval procedures thus become part of military planning. For Europe, greater responsibility therefore also means examining civilian infrastructure for its importance in crises and defense. The value of an additional unit remains limited if its deployment fails due to a lack of transport options. Cooperation between the EU and NATO touches here on an area where economic regulation and military requirements meet directly.

Fuel and Refineries as a Defense Issue

Even more fundamental is the supply of fuel. Kubilius warned on October 28 against relying solely on peacetime consumption. “When the crisis comes, it could be significantly more,” he said, according to Euronews, regarding potential demand. He pointed to the requirements of moving and supplying large troop contingents within a short time. Citing confidentiality, he did not say how long existing stocks would last in the event of a conflict. The statement thus identifies a concrete challenge without publicly quantifying a specific supply gap.

This gives the debate on European defense capability an industrial dimension that goes beyond the production of weapons. Aircraft need jet fuel, vehicles need diesel and bases need a reliable energy supply. Military readiness therefore requires production, storage and transport to function even under increased demand. Civilian and military requirements can rise at the same time. Robust planning must take such overlaps into account. The decisive question then is which reserves are available, which capacities can be expanded at short notice and how supply is to be protected against disruption.

EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen linked these questions to the future of European refineries on the same day. “We must create an environment that supports sufficient domestic fuel production in Europe,” he said in a published statement. The Commission intends to work with industry on increasing production and a longer-term perspective for the sector. According to the Commission, EU refineries supply about 70 percent of the jet fuel and 85 percent of the diesel consumed in Europe. Security of supply, competitiveness and the transition to other fuels thus become interconnected political tasks.

For European governments, this involves a difficult balance. They must supply today’s armed forces while deciding on the future industrial structure. Short-term availability and long-term investment follow different timelines. Companies need reliable conditions, while governments must respond to changing threats. Defense responsibility therefore also includes the ability to sustain such decisions over several budget years. An announced capacity only becomes militarily relevant once it can be produced, transported and used under crisis conditions.

Britain’s Multibillion-Pound Package for Ukraine

The United Kingdom showed how Europe can expand its support with a package for Ukraine published on October 28. The Treasury announced additional financial support of more than ten billion pounds. This includes economic aid and guarantees as well as an expansion of export financing. A further 500 million pounds was earmarked for Ukrainian air defense this winter. The components must, however, be kept apart: guarantees, financing capacity and direct military support work differently. The total sum therefore does not correspond to an immediate delivery of military equipment of the same value.

The British example also illustrates that European security extends beyond the institutional framework of the European Union. For a viable division of labor, what counts is which states can make which contributions and how these are linked. Economic support can stabilize Ukraine’s capacity to act; air defense protects the population and infrastructure; long-term financing creates planning certainty. These contributions complement each other but remain interdependent. A military commitment loses effectiveness if the necessary equipment arrives too late. Financial stabilization alone, in turn, cannot provide protection against air attacks.

Europe’s Capability Gaps and the Review of the US Troop Presence

Europe’s dependence on the US is particularly pronounced in capabilities that make large-scale operations possible in the first place. An analysis published in mid-October by the European Parliamentary Research Service cites intelligence, command, air-to-air refueling and strategic airlift, among others. This is background to the current consultations, not a new political statement from the past two days. The analysis also describes an American strategy that combines greater European responsibility with a focus on US security interests and competition with China. For Europe, this results in a task that can hardly be solved by additional arms purchases alone.

If Europe is to be able to sustain larger operations itself, it must also master the links between individual capabilities. Intelligence must reach the responsible bodies in time, command structures must implement decisions and supply systems must function over long periods. This raises a political question: who within Europe takes on which responsibility? If several states seek to close the same gaps while other tasks remain unfilled, joint capacity to act grows only to a limited extent. An effective division of labor therefore requires priorities, reliable commitments and the willingness to coordinate national planning.

The American troop presence remains a particularly sensitive point. As early as June, Hegseth had announced a review of US deployments in Europe that was to last up to six months and include consultations with Congress. This earlier decision forms part of the background to today’s uncertainty. It is neither a new withdrawal decision from October 28 or 29 nor evidence that a specific troop reduction has already been decided. For European planners, however, it is relevant that the scope and tasks of the American presence are under review.

Conclusion: Europe’s Self-Reliance Will Be Measured by Results

The developments of the past two days therefore do not add up to a simple picture of American withdrawal. Trump is claiming a leading diplomatic role, Hegseth is building partnerships in Asia, and European institutions are working on the concrete prerequisites for military readiness. What remains open is how these activities will be translated into a lasting division of responsibilities. A successful negotiation on Ukraine could create new obligations for Europe. If the talks fail, the question remains of how military and economic support can be reliably continued.

For Europe, greater self-reliance will therefore be decided by verifiable results: available air defense, functioning transport routes, a secure energy supply and an industry that can deliver agreed quantities on time. From Washington, in turn, allies need clarity about which contributions the US will commit to in the long term. The central question thus remains open. Its answer will emerge from political agreements and their practical implementation, and from whether both sides can jointly secure the time between Europe’s build-up plans and actually available capabilities.