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After the first round of its presidential election, Brazil faces a decision on its future direction with significant consequences far beyond South America. Flávio Bolsonaro of the right-wing Partido Liberal (PL) surprisingly emerged as the strongest candidate from the first round on Sunday. Incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party (PT) follows closely behind. The decision on the political leadership of Latin America's largest economy will therefore not be made until October 25.
BRASÍLIA. After the first round of its presidential election, Brazil faces a decision on its future direction with significant consequences far beyond South America. Flávio Bolsonaro of the right-wing Partido Liberal (PL) surprisingly emerged as the strongest candidate from the first round on Sunday. Incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) follows closely behind. The decision on the political leadership of Latin America’s largest economy will therefore not be made until October 25.
According to figures published early Monday morning by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), with 99.99 percent of ballot boxes counted, Bolsonaro received 56,104,268 votes, or 47.03 percent of valid votes. Lula received 53,876,617 votes, or 45.16 percent. The gap is thus only around 2.23 million votes, or 1.87 percentage points. In total, more than 125 million valid votes were cast. 2.3 million votes were blank and around 3.67 million were invalid.
Because neither candidate received more than 50 percent of valid votes, a second round will be held on October 25, 2026. An important qualification is therefore necessary for any political assessment of the result: Brazil has not yet elected a new president. Sunday’s vote has, however, significantly changed the balance of political power, not only through Bolsonaro’s lead in the presidential election but also through the results for Congress.
On election night, Flávio Bolsonaro described the result as a signal for political change. “O Brasil quer mudança” (Brazil wants change), he told journalists, according to the state news agency Agência Brasil. Almost 56 million Brazilians had given him their trust for change, he said.
Bolsonaro also linked his result to concrete ideas for a possible government. He announced a state with fewer ministries and said he wanted the opportunity “to take care of Brazil and the Brazilian people.” His interpretation of the election result is, for now, a political statement by the candidate and not a finding of the electoral court. The narrow margin and the need for a second round show that the country remains divided into two large political camps of almost equal size.
Lula’s response was correspondingly restrained. The president acknowledged that he had expected to win in the first round. At the same time, he placed the result in the context of the democratic process.
“Nós acabamos de ter uma lição da democracia no Brasil com a votação do povo brasileiro,” Lula said on election night: through the vote of its people, Brazil had just experienced a lesson in democracy. The second round, he said, would now be the moment when the country’s true political picture would become clearer.
The President of the TSE, Kassio Nunes Marques, also emphasized respect for the will of the voters after the conclusion of the first round. “A eleição não termina quando a votação é encerrada. Ela se completa quando a vontade soberana do eleitorado é conhecida e respeitada,” Nunes Marques declared. An election does not end when the polls close, but only when the sovereign will of the electorate is known and respected.
According to the TSE, voting and counting proceeded largely normally. A temporary delay in publishing the results was due to a technical problem with data provision and did not affect the actual vote count. International observers reported no serious incidents that significantly impaired the electoral process.
To understand what political course a government can actually take from 2027, however, looking at the presidency alone is not enough. The PL achieved a considerable success in the election to the Chamber of Deputies. According to the Câmara dos Deputados, the party will have 121 deputies in the new legislative period, making it the largest caucus. That is 24 seats more than in the previous election. The federation of PT, PCdoB and PV follows with 82 deputies.
The shift in the Senate is even more pronounced. There, 54 of the total 81 seats were up for election on Sunday. The PL won 19 of these seats and is expected to have a total of 28 senators from February 2027. According to the current count, the PT will have nine, the União-Progressistas party federation eleven and the MDB eight senators. This is of central importance for the coming presidency.
Should Flávio Bolsonaro win the second round, he would take office with a much stronger party of his own in parliament. That does not, however, automatically mean a stable governing majority: Brazil’s Congress remains split among numerous parties, so even a PL president would need coalitions and agreements with other parties for legislation.
For Lula, the parliamentary starting position would be more difficult. Even if he wins on October 25, from 2027 he would have to work with a Congress in which his main political opponent has gained considerable weight. Especially in the Senate, this could matter for personnel decisions and legislation. The Brazilian election result therefore consists of two different messages: the presidency has not yet been decided. The shift in Congress in favor of the PL, on the other hand, is already a structural outcome of this election.
For the European Union, the Brazilian election is taking place under fundamentally different economic conditions than the 2022 presidential election. The long-negotiated trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union was signed on January 17, 2026. Since May 1, 2026, the trade part has been provisionally applied. The broader partnership agreement still has to go through further ratification procedures.
For Europe, then, the question is no longer primarily whether an agreement will materialize at all after decades of negotiations. What will matter instead is how the next Brazilian government uses the existing agreement politically and economically, and how it deals with European environmental, agricultural and industrial standards. The scale is considerable. According to the Brazilian government, trade in goods between Brazil and the European Union reached around 100 billion US dollars in 2025. Brazil exported goods worth 49.8 billion dollars to the EU and imported goods worth 50.3 billion dollars. The EU was thus Brazil’s second most important trading partner.
In March, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira described the Mercosur-EU agreement as an instrument for diversifying Brazil’s international partnerships, modernizing Brazilian industry and integrating the country more closely into international value chains. “Esse acordo vem para equilibrar e ampliar essa relação,” Vieira said. The agreement is intended to balance and expand the relationship. The European Union, he added, is also already the largest foreign investor in Brazil and holds almost half of the stock of foreign direct investment in the country.
For European companies, this makes the election directly relevant. It concerns a market of more than 200 million people, raw materials, agricultural products, energy, industrial supply chains and investment, but increasingly also strategic areas such as green hydrogen, renewable energy and critical minerals. Brazil and the EU already intensified their cooperation in these fields in 2026. In June, representatives of both sides negotiated cooperation on low-emission hydrogen, energy infrastructure, industrial decarbonization and sustainable value chains for critical raw materials.
A Lula victory would initially mean greater continuity in foreign policy. The current government has institutionally linked its relationship with the European Union closely to the Mercosur agreement, climate policy, industrial policy and the diversification of Brazil’s foreign relations. Foreign Minister Vieira explicitly described the agreement as a strategic response to the fragmentation of the international order.
Under Lula, Brasília could therefore be expected to further expand economic relations with the EU without making Europe its exclusive foreign policy reference point. Brazil’s foreign policy to date has pursued relations with Europe, China, the United States, the BRICS states and other emerging economies in parallel. For Europe, the link between trade and climate policy would be particularly relevant. The Mercosur-EU agreement contains commitments on environmental protection, climate policy and sustainable development. At the same time, Europe is tightening environmental and traceability requirements for international supply chains. Brazilian ministries no longer treat these standards merely as environmental policy, but also as a question of international competitiveness.
Another Lula government would likely try to combine these requirements with Brazilian industrial policy: renewable energy, domestic processing of critical raw materials, decarbonization of industry and the expansion of higher-value exports instead of being limited to traditional raw material supplies. The political room for maneuver of a re-elected Lula would, however, be smaller than control of the presidency alone might suggest. With 121 PL deputies and a greatly enlarged PL bloc in the Senate, his government would still have to organize broad parliamentary alliances for key projects.
A Bolsonaro victory would mean a more distinct political change of course. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to automatically conclude that it would rupture economic relations with Europe.
His government program, filed with Brazil’s electoral authority, places greater emphasis on economic opening, international investment and a foreign policy explicitly oriented toward Brazilian economic interests. Among the foreign economic priorities is the resumption or acceleration of Brazil’s accession process to the OECD. The candidate also highlights the integration of Brazilian companies into international value chains and the attraction of foreign investment. The official government programs of the presidential candidates are filed with the TSE. For Europe, this could result in an ambivalent relationship.
On the one hand, a Bolsonaro government would have economic reasons to make use of the trade regime with the EU in force since May. The European Union is too large as a market and investor to be easily bypassed by an economically oriented Brazilian government. On the other hand, conflicts over European regulation could come more to the fore. Agriculture, environmental standards, traceability and possible trade restrictions would be particularly affected. The current dispute over Brazilian animal products shows that these conflicts are not a theoretical question. European requirements on the use of antimicrobial substances led to trade restrictions in 2026. Brasília responded with new control measures and a traceability protocol.
At the end of September, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Development Minister Márcio Elias Rosa again negotiated trade issues with the European Commission. According to the Brazilian government, the talks covered European steel quotas and restrictions on agricultural products, among other things. Following an inspection, the European side reportedly gave positive signals for the resumption of certain Brazilian poultry and honey exports; at the same time, Brazil pushed for an accelerated procedure for beef.
Under a Bolsonaro government, such regulatory disputes could be treated more as classic trade conflicts. For European companies, this would not necessarily mean less trade, but possibly politically tougher negotiations over the terms of that trade.
Regardless of the winner, the most important immediate test for relations between Brasília and Europe is likely to be the practical implementation of the Mercosur-EU agreement. The trade part is already being provisionally applied. According to the Brazilian government, European tariffs are to be eliminated on 95 percent of tariff lines; measured by value, this affects 92 percent of Brazilian exports to the EU.
At the end of September, just a few days before the election, Brazilian and European officials described the effects of the agreement in force since May as already positive for trade flows. This also means that a change of government would encounter an economic framework that is already in operation. A new government could change political priorities, regulatory implementation and negotiating style. The agreement itself, however, would not simply be new bargaining material, but part of an institutional process that has already begun. For Europe, this reduces part of the uncertainty.
The second major question for Europe concerns energy and raw materials. Brazil has considerable deposits of strategically important minerals and, at the same time, a high share of renewable energy by international standards. The EU is trying to diversify its supply chains for critical raw materials and reduce dependence on individual supplier countries. This is precisely where European industrial policy and Brazilian development interests intersect.
The current Brazilian government is trying to ensure that this demand does not merely generate additional raw material exports. Talks with European representatives in 2026 also focused on local value creation, hydrogen, energy infrastructure and industrial decarbonization. Under Lula, this combination of climate policy, industrial policy and strategic partnership with Europe would likely continue.
Under Bolsonaro, the focus could shift more toward investment, market access, mining, agribusiness and economic competitiveness. How much existing climate and environmental requirements would change, however, would have to be measured by concrete government decisions. Before the second round, it would be premature to derive the actual regulatory policy of a future government from campaign rhetoric.
European observers in particular should therefore not focus exclusively on Lula and Bolsonaro. Brazil’s political system gives Congress considerable power over legislation, the budget and key institutional decisions. Sunday’s election has shifted this parliamentary dimension.
With 121 deputies in the lower house and an expected 28 of 81 senators, the PL will have a parliamentary position from 2027 that any government must take into account. A President Flávio Bolsonaro would thus have a significantly more favorable party-political starting position than Lula. Nevertheless, he too would have to work with other parties, because 121 of 513 deputies do not constitute a majority of their own.
A Lula victory, by contrast, would produce a form of political cohabitation under Brazilian conditions: a left-wing president facing a Congress in which right-wing and center-right parties carry considerable weight. Foreign policy initiatives can be steered largely by the presidency, but Congress remains decisive for legislation, the budget and the domestic implementation of international commitments.
For Brussels and the European capitals, the first round therefore does not yet provide a definitive answer to the question of which course Brazil will take from January 2027. It does, however, provide three clear findings.
First: Flávio Bolsonaro enters the second round with a lead. 47.03 percent versus 45.16 percent is a politically significant gap, but not a decision. On October 25, the votes of those who chose other candidates in the first round or did not vote will be decisive. A serious analysis cannot derive the winner of the second round from yesterday’s result alone.
Second: Brazil’s Congress has changed. The PL will become the largest single party in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. This limits the room for maneuver of a possible fourth Lula term and would give a Bolsonaro government a stronger parliamentary base.
Third: Europe and Brazil are now more closely linked economically and institutionally than at the last presidential election. The Mercosur-EU trade agreement has been provisionally applied since May, bilateral trade in goods amounted to around 100 billion dollars in 2025, and cooperation increasingly extends to energy, industry and critical raw materials.
For this reason, on the morning after the Brazilian election, Europe does not face a simple choice between continuity and rupture.
A Lula victory would likely mean continuity in the political upgrading of Mercosur, in climate and energy cooperation and in Brazil’s strategy of foreign policy diversification, albeit under more difficult parliamentary conditions.
A Flávio Bolsonaro victory would bring new political leadership with a stronger emphasis on market opening, investment and an economically defined foreign policy. At the same time, European environmental and trade rules could become a more visible area of conflict. The Mercosur-EU trade framework already in force and the importance of European investment, however, also set economic limits on any possible political reorientation.
The decisive Brazilian election has therefore not yet taken place. But the first round has already decided something else: whoever moves into the Palácio do Planalto on January 1, 2027, will govern Brazil in a changed institutional environment. A stronger PL in Congress meets an economic relationship with Europe that has become closer through the new Mercosur agreement. For Europe, this marks the beginning of a three-week period of political uncertainty. For Brazil, the real battle for the presidency is only just beginning.
Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), Câmara dos Deputados, Senado Federal/Agência Senado, Agência Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, Ministério de Minas e Energia, Siscomex and other official Brazilian government bodies. As of: October 5, 2026.